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This paper analyzes differences in the effects of employee representations 
between family firms and non-family firms. First, managers from 
non-family firms have a more favorable response towards unions as 
organizations than managers from family firms. Managers from family 
firms tend to regard unions as harmful to their management, because 
unions may bring in outsiders, to the detriment of the management. Second, 
voice-oriented employee associations tend to exist more in non-family 
firms than in family ones. Third, these associations have a voice effect 
suppressing turnover rates in non-family firms, though not in family ones. 
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1. Introduction 
Most of the existing literature on industrial relations tend to target large firms rather 
than small ones in spite of the significance to shed light on the latter in Japan as well as 
in Western countries. As a result, industrial relations in Japanese small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) has been invisible. This is by no means a small 
problem. In Japan, 41.2 millions of employees are working in firms the number of 
employees of which are less than 100. It accounts for 71.8% of the workforce in Japan1. 
We will not be able to have a full understanding of industrial relations without covering 
SMEs. We specifically focus on employee representation2  to study the industrial 
relations of Japanese SMEs.  
For many decades, employee representation has expressed worker opinions through 
unionism and collective bargaining. However, unions have become less powerful. 
During the fourth quarter of the twentieth century, the emergence of global economic 
competition, de-regulation, and technological change, resulted in a decrease in the 
unionization rate. This decrease led to a weakening in the bargaining power of unions. 
At present, since most employees no longer belong to unions, they are represented by a 
variety of other non-union institutions (Bryson, 2004; Bryson et al., 2013).  
Several studies argue that union membership rates and the levels of collective 
bargaining coverage are lower in SMEs than in larger firms in many European countries 
(Bouquin et al.,2007; Kirton and Read, 2007; Forth et al.,2006; Holten and Crouch, 
2014).3 Similarly, there is a significant difference in the unionization rate between 
                                                   
1 Economic Census (2014). 
2 We define employee representation as the organizations, or practices, that express the collective 
voice of employees. Labor unions and employee associations are examples of employee representations. 
3 Forth et al.(2006) show that only 3 per cent of all workplaces in SMEs recognized unions, compared 
with 31 per cent of workplaces in large firms. 
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SMEs and large firms in Japan, as Figure 1 shows. In Japanese SMEs, unions are 
uncommon; if managers communicate with employees through unions, it is by formal 
negotiation. Unions are protected by law, giving them greater power, so managers tend 
to prefer to negotiate with employees informally.  
In this study, we focus on employee associations. They have more flexibility than 
unions. By using this form of organization, the employee and the manager are able to 
communicate in confidence in an informal setting. This has benefits and disadvantages. 
Due to their informal nature, they are not safeguarded by law. In Japan, employee 
associations are more prevalent than enterprise unions or joint consultations among 
SMEs (Morishima and Tsuru 2000). These aspects of employee associations, however, 
have been largely ignored in the literature. 
To further investigate the function of employee representation in SMEs, we will focus 
on the difference between family and non-family SMEs. Table 1 shows that the smaller 
the firm size, the higher the percentage owned by family members. Autocratic family 
owners are averse to criticism voiced through employee representations.  
It is noteworthy that there is another type of manager in Japanese SMEs. They are 
managers of subsidiary firms who are former union members and who were dispatched 
from unionized large parent firms. Such managers not only understand the importance 
of a collective voice, but also have sympathy towards their workers. Hence, in Japan, 
there are two types of manager: (1) family owners (autocratic in nature), and (2) 
managers dispatched from parent firms. The two types have different views about voice 
institutions such as labor unions and employee associations, and this leads to a 
difference in the effects of employee associations. More precisely, family owners 
dislike both unions and employee associations, while managers who are dispatched 
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from parent firms do not necessarily dislike unions or employee associations. 
This paper analyzes the different effects of employee representations between family 
firms and non-family firms. To concretize, we examine three hypotheses. First, the 
managers’ attitude towards a collective voice, such as those in unions, is different 
between family firms and non-family firms. Second, voice-oriented employee 
associations are less likely to be formed in family firms than in non-family ones. Third, 
even if employee associations in family firms exist, the effects of employee associations 
on turnover are weaker in non-family firms. To analyze the second hypothesis, we use 
the voice-exit model presented by Freeman and Medoff (1984), focusing on the 
difference in the voice effects between family firms and non-family firms.  
 
2. Background 
In this section, we will discuss the owner’s attitude towards a collective voice in 
family firms of SMEs, such as unions and employee associations, based on previous 
studies. The previous studies of industrial relations in SMEs tend to polarize into a 
“small is beautiful” scenario where small firms facilitate close and harmonious working 
relationships or “bleak house” perspective that small firms are dictatorially run with 
employees suffering poor working conditions4  (Wilkinson, 1999). However, these 
polarized views are too simplistic. Ram (1991) insists that workplace relations in SMEs 
may be “complex, informal, and contradictory” rather than simply either harmonious or 
autocratic. In our research, we will focus on the differences of ownerships to clarify the 
complex, informal, and contradictory industrial relations of SMEs. 
Generally, family owners tend to keep out labor unions by prohibiting them from 
                                                   
4 The former is presented by Bolton Committee Report (1971) and the latter is represented by Rainnie 
(1985). 
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organizing – this then creates a hostile relationship between the firms and its workers. 
Mueller and Philippon (2007) show that family managers are more likely to treat labor 
unions as outsiders; they try to prevent the formation of unions by developing good 
labor relations. Because family firms can enjoy long relationships with employees, 
employees may find it easier to establish a personal bond with, and develop loyalty to, 
the family. The employees feel a sense of protection and support because of this 
relationship; joining unions is less appealing to the employees. 
Family firms account for the majority of SMEs, whose family owners are in an 
adversarial relationship with unions, which are viewed as a threat to the harmonious 
relationship between the owners and their employees. This familial environment within 
the firm is an objective that managers and lower-level employees have worked together 
to achieve, but which may be disrupted with the presence of labor unions.5  
When managers are best placed to make decisions, they tend to resist union 
involvement, which may dilute management control. Typically, they are also unwilling 
to receive criticism (Ram et al., 2001; Ryan, 2005). Ram et al. (2001) show that owners 
in family firms may attempt to eliminate this form of voice, taking the view that 
employee representations undermine and disrupt the family atmosphere. Ryan (2005) 
explain the reason of the apparent aversion to trade unions among managers in SMEs is 
unwillingness among managers to share control. Van Gyes (2006) and Wilkinson 
(1999) show that in SMEs, the adversarial attitude of managers who resist the collective 
                                                   
5 There are two reasons why family-owned firms could be successful in handling hostile labor 
relations. First, family owners may be less compromising than hired managers. Due to large 
ownership stakes, for family owners the (psychological and other) costs of confronting hostile labor are 
more endurable than for salaried managers who tend to prefer the “quiet life” (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan 2003). Second, due to their longer time horizon, family firms have a comparative 
advantage in maintaining implicit labor contracts, and thus they are especially successful at winning 
workers’ loyalty and cooperation. Salaried managers may lack the credibility necessary to implement 
such implicit contracts if the firm’s shares are widely held, due to the possibility of a hostile takeover 
(Shleifer and Summers 1988).  
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voice of unions leads to a lower union membership rate, making it difficult for unions to 
organize. 
Family firms are dominated either by a legacy of a founder, or by long established 
owner-management that operates through a mixture of paternalism and autocracy. 
Family managers prefer informal negotiations over formal policies or practices to 
suppress employee resistance, or to prevent workplace dissonance caused by unions or 
other collective forms of representation (Atkinson and Storey, 1994; Moule, 1998). 
Marlow (2003) shows that 93 percent of managers favored open door policies and had a 
policy of ‘informal discussion and resolution of workplace problems.’ With the 
assurance that the manager will act in favor of each employee’s ‘best’ interests, 
employees may be acclimated to a lack of formal, collective voice instead of finding 
personal solutions to this problem (Ryan, 2005). 
 
3. Industrial relations in Japanese Firms and working hypotheses  
3.1 Industrial relations in Japanese Firms 
The previous section discussed that, on the basis of former studies, family firm 
owners tend to have a more hostile attitude towards labor unions, because these unions 
ruin the harmonious atmospheres in their firms. This relation between a family firm 
owner and unions is prominent in SMEs. The owners whose companies do not have 
unions believed that unions would hinder good employee relations, because they create 
an unnecessary division between management and labor (Marlow, 2002). However, 
caution should be exercised in applying these findings immediately to any Japanese 
firm, since labor unions in Japan are characterized as enterprise unions. This implies 
that unions are not necessarily considered and treated as outsiders.  
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There are three reasons behind the harmonious labor-management relationship in 
Japanese firms. First, top executives were employees who were promoted, so they have 
sympathy with an employee association. The manager selection mechanism in Japan 
encourages a management style that emphasizes the interests of employees. Being 
originally internal employees promoted under the practice of selecting management 
positions by ranking from a hierarchy of regular employees, many Japanese managers 
share the experience of being part of an employee association. In the absence of 
corporate control through the active market, the practice of selecting top management 
becomes institutionalized at the enterprise level (Aoki, et al., 1997). Many managers 
emphasize the employees’ interests and this brings stability to labor-management 
relationships. 
Second, enterprise-based unionism uniquely creates goal-alignment between labor 
and management. Japanese unions are organized along enterprise lines, rather than 
within craft or industrial lines that typify American unions. Therefore, managers and 
employees typically share more interests in the enterprise union system than in 
industrial or craft unions in the U.S. Furthermore, most Japanese unions are enterprise 
unions which consist of regular workers who are mostly union members. They are likely 
to have a common interest in improving their own firm’s competitiveness to ensure 
growth and stable employment. For the reasons mentioned above, unlike characteristic 
Euro-American companies, Japanese managers are not hostile towards unions.  
Third, unions and managers can maintain a cooperative relationship because some 
managers have experienced being union leaders. In Japan, many department heads, 
board members, and even some presidents, have not only been union members in the 
past but also played important and active roles in these organizations (Jacoby, 2005). 
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Some individuals have even progressed from the union to a position on the board or 
audit committee. Fujimura (2000) shows that 41.3 percent of all directors promoted 
internally had once been officers at some level of the enterprise union. Japanese 
managers and directors who are former union leaders help encourage cooperative 
relationships between management and employees.   
 
3.2 Working hypotheses  
As aforementioned, managers of family firms are generally hostile towards the 
unions because the latter may be detrimental to the firms’ harmonious environment. 
However, unions are not considered as outsiders in many Japanese firms. If a firm is 
relatively less averse towards unions, then employee associations are less likely to be 
treated as outsiders. For this reason, when we analyze the relationship between 
management and employee associations, we should examine if managers in the family 
firms exhibit hostile behavior towards employee associations who initiate open 
discussion of management concerns such as wage policy, and similar issues.  
We describe three hypotheses which account for differences in manager-employee 
relations between family firms and non-family ones in Japanese SMEs.  
First, we will examine the hypothesis that family firm managers are hostile towards a 
collective voice. We will examine the hypothesis that managers in family firms are 
hostile toward unions even in Japanese SMEs.  
In other words, managers of SMEs are generally known to be averse towards unions 
as previous studies show. However, this may differ for subsidiary firms whose 
presidents were originally dispatched from large parent firms that had cooperative 
labor-management relationships with the unions. Many large Japanese firms form 
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enterprise groups involving networks of associated or subsidiary firms and parent firms. 
Parent firms monitor, discipline, and control the management of their subsidiary firms 
by dispatching board members and replacing presidents when corporate performance of 
subsidiary firms deteriorates (Aoki 1984). Thus, the managers of subsidiary 
non-unionized firms were former union members of the unionized parent firms, and are 
therefore more likely to adopt a cooperative and employee oriented (pro-union) 
management. They are sympathetic towards unions and consider Japanese enterprise 
unions necessary in contributing to productivity enhancement (Morikawa 2010; 
Tachibanaki and Noda 2000). 
There is another type of manager in non-unionized subsidiary firms. Managers who 
are promoted from the hierarchy of regular employees are likely to have an empathy 
with these staff. In addition, some other board members may have been dispatched from 
parent firms. Therefore, these managers from the parent firms introduce corporate 
cultures to the subsidiary SMEs. The managers of these firms, therefore, acknowledge 
the significance of the collective voice. Accordingly, a hypothesis on management 
attitudes toward unions based on the types of firms is derived:  
Hypothesis 1: Managers show a more favorable attitude towards unions in 
non-family firms than in family firms. 
Second, we will focus on voice-oriented employee associations. Koike (1977) (1981) 
pioneered research relating to Japanese employee associations. Koike (1981) found that 
there were employee associations called “clubs” or “employee reunions” in three of 
seven the non-unionized SMEs. Here, they discuss with their managers concerns 
involving wages, working conditions, production plans, and so on. According to Koike 
(1981), these employee organizations should be called “de facto enterprise unions” for 
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the following reasons. First, employee associations charge fees to those who choose to 
participate. Second, employee associations have a voice in the decision-making with 
respect to their working conditions. According to Intrafirm Communication Research 
Group (1991), there are two types of employee association: Voice-oriented employee 
associations and Employee associations for socializing. Voice-oriented employee 
associations often discuss working conditions and industrial planning with management; 
managers have a high regard for their functions of aggregating and communicating 
employee views.  
As described earlier, many autocratic owners of smaller businesses resist the use of 
formal policies that pose potential damage to the team environment (Marlow, 2002). 
Forth et al.(2005) show that in SMEs union membership was also less common in 
family firms than non-family ones, though they don’t focus on employee associations. 
We will examine the following hypothesis. Even if employee associations are different 
from unions, they have a collective voice, and their activities include discussing 
working conditions with managers. So, in contrast to managers of non-family firms, 
managers of family firms are reluctant to enable the formation of voice-oriented 
employee associations, if the associations have activities to discuss working conditions 
with managers.  
Hypothesis 2: Managers tend to avoid voice-oriented employee associations in 
small and medium-sized family firms. 
Third, we examine the difference in the effects of employee associations between the 
two types of firms by applying an exit-voice model in which unions serve to reduce 
employee turnover rate, as presented by Freeman and Medoff (1984). According to the 
theory, employees who are dissatisfied with working conditions or the management can 
11 
 
express displeasure indirectly to the management through the union, which has a 
functioning voice, and, as a result, the employee turnover rate is restrained. The effects 
of employee associations on employee turnover may vary between family and 
non-family firms, if employee associations possess functions like those of enterprise 
unions. 
We expect that the effect of voice-oriented employee associations on turnover differs 
between family firms and non-family firms. Managers in non-family firms are likely to 
show a better understanding of the importance of the positive effects of union voice on 
productivity. There are several studies showing the positive effects of unions among 
large Japanese firms. Bryson et al (2006) show that management responsiveness to an 
employee’s voice is a critical factor to succeed in improving labor productivity. In 
two-way communication, both sides learn new arrangements that can be used to govern 
the workplace and guide efficient production (Verma 2005). Such questioning 
establishes dialogic interactions, otherwise absent from managerial deliberations, which 
is helpful in finding solutions to problems.  
Managers in non-family firms understand that it is important for them to listen to 
their employees’ voices to enhance their motivation. On the other hand, managers in 
family firms are less likely to listen to concerns voiced through employee associations. 
This is because family firm owners strongly believe that they are in the best place to 
make decisions and therefore prefer to deal with employees personally in the form of a 
“negotiated order.” This leads to a low level of responsiveness to the employees’ 
collective voice. We can show the hypothesis in the following way: 
Hypothesis 3: The effect of voice-oriented employee associations on turnover is 
larger in non-family firms than in family firms. 
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4.  Data and Methods 
4.1 Data Description 
In this section, we explain data, methods of analysis, definitions of variables, and 
descriptive statistics. The data we use is from the “Questionnaire survey which concerns 
communication about working conditions between top executives and employees of 
Japanese SMEs.” The data were collected by The Japan Institute for Labor Policy and 
Training (JILPT) on July, 2006.  
They focused on 12,000 firms whose employees are less than 1,000, from 19 
industries, excluding agriculture, forestry, fisheries, mining, compound services, 
government, and industries which they were unable to classify6. They selected 12,000 
firms from “the corporate databases by Tokyo Shoko Research, Ltd. (TSR)”. The 
method of the survey is postal survey, wherein they distributed and collected the 
questionnaire by postal mail. The sample period is July 12 to September 11, 2006. A 
total of 2,440 firms responded, a rate of 20.3%. In this paper, we will use all the samples 
collected, except for the non-responders. 
 
4.2. Definition of variables 
We first defined family firms from answers to the question “how is your manager 
promoted?”7: The possible answers were: “1. Founder, 2. Succeeding to parents, 3. 
Succeeding to brothers or relatives, 4. Promoted from employee, 5. Hired as a President, 
6. Dispatched from parent firm, 7. Others.” Thereafter, we categorized responders who 
                                                   
6 This classification is consistent with Japan Standard Industry Classification (JSIC). 
7 Even if we define a family firm as a response to the question of “how many family members or 
relatives of the president are on the board excluding the president?”, the result of our estimation is the 
same. 
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chose from 1 to 3 as family firms, and ones who chose 4 or 6 as non-family firms. When 
the response is 5 or 7 and more than half of the directors are family members of the 
representative director, we classify it as a family firm.   
Next, we define variables for the voice-oriented employee association. We used a 
questionnaire on what activities the employee association is involved in, namely: (1) 
discussion with managers about labor conditions such as wages, labor hours, leisure and 
fringe benefits; (2) activities of mutual aid such as congratulatory or condolence money 
and loans; (3) tasks to handle complainants; (4) activities to discuss with managers 
about production planning and management policy; and (5) the work of employee social 
clubs. If the organization has activities involving (1) or (4), we define these 
organizations as voice- oriented employee associations. Other variables are shown in 
Table 2. 
 
4.3. Descriptive statistics    
Table 3 summarizes descriptive statistics. Starting with the dependent variables of the 
three hypotheses, the annual average voluntary employee turnover is approximately 
6.9% in family firms, and 5.1% in non-family firms. The rate of voice- oriented 
employee associations is 10.9% in family firms, and 19.0% in non-family firms.  
Moreover, the results from Q16(a) to Q16(f) show that managers in family firms 
consider unions to be more harmful to family firms than to non-family firms. All the 
responses are statistically significant. For example, 71.3% of family firms do not think 
unions are necessary to the firm, while for non-family firms, it is 47.6%.  
In respect of employee associations, 8.9% of family firms have activities that involve 
discussions with managers regarding labor conditions, while 17.4% of non-family firms 
14 
 
have such activities. However, there are no significant differences in the activities to 
discuss production planning or management policy, between family firms and 
non-family ones. 
 
5.  Econometric specifications and Estimations 
5. 1.   Analysis of the Attitude of Managers toward Unions  
In this section, we estimate probit models of the managers’ attitudes toward unions to 
test hypothesis 1. We used six questions on their attitude towards unions as dependent 
variables. We asked: “Can you rate the following statements in terms of how closely 
they reflect your firm’s manager’s opinion?” These relate to the managers’ attitudes 
towards unions: (a) Unions are necessary for your company, (b) Unions are 
organizations that make unfair demands, (c) If there is a union in your company, 
outsiders will tend to interrupt management, (d) Unions are useful for managers to grasp 
the employee’s intentions and needs, (e) Unions are useful in conveying a manager’s 
intentions, (f) Even if there are no unions, managers can grasp the employee’s needs.  
The respondents could choose one of the following for each statement: 1. Agree, 2. 
Relatively Agree, 3. Relatively Disagree, and 4. Disagree. We make binary variables in 
this way. For example, in the case of (a), we categorized respondents who chose from 1 
or 2 as one, and those who chose 3 or 4 as zero. However, in the case of (b), we 
categorized respondents who chose 1 or 2 as zero, and those who chose 3 or 4 as one, 
indicating a negative attitude towards unions. 
We used probit models to estimate the manager’s attitude towards unions. More 
specifically, we will test the hypothesis that managers in family firms have a worse 
impression of unions than non-family ones. This is because many managers from 
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non-family firms were promoted when they were still employees in the firm. So, they 
may possibly consider the needs of their former colleagues. In contrast, most managers 
in family firms did not work as past employees in the firm. In the case of those who did 
work as employees in the family firms, they were already treated as future managers, so 
they were assessed differently from other employees. Thus, they do not share the same 
needs and potential grievances as other employees do. For this reason, those managers 
in family firms tend to have a more negative impression of unions than those in 
non-family ones. To test hypothesis 1, we estimate (5.1): 
Pr (Neg impression to UNION=1) = α+β*family firm +xγ＋u (5.1) 
Table 4 shows the maximum likelihood estimates of (5.1). The coefficients of the 
family firm dummy are significant at the 1％ level. Column 1 shows that managers in 
family firms do not think unions are necessary to the company. Column 2 shows that 
they consider unions as harmful to the firm, because unions make unfair demands to the 
manager. Column 3 shows they think that the existence of a union will disrupt 
management, with unions being considered an outside organization. Columns 4 and 5 
shows that they do not think that unions are useful in capturing the needs of the 
employees, nor do the unions convey their intentions. Column 6 shows that they can 
grasp the needs of the employees, even if there is no union in their firm. All the results 
show that managers in family firms do not think unions are useful in their firms, thus 
regarding unions as harmful organizations that interrupt their management.  
 
5. 2.   Voice-oriented employee associations in family and non-family firms 
Next, we estimate probit models to examine hypothesis 2. As shown in section 4.1 
and table 2, we use those five variables as dependent variables. We estimate probit 
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models of the following (5.2): 
Pr (Firms have activities=1) = α+β*family firm dum+xγ＋u (5.2) 
We test the hypothesis that managers in family firms do not allow employees to form 
organizational structures that may impede management progress. So, we assume that the 
employee associations which have activities (1) and (4) exist less in family firms than in 
non-family ones. We also define employee associations which have activities (1) and (4) 
as “voice-oriented employee associations”. 
Table 5 shows the estimates of equation (5.1). The coefficient of the dummy variable 
for family firms is negatively significant in columns (1) and (3). The results in column 
(1) show that the number of employee associations which discuss working conditions 
with managers is less in family firms than in non-family firms. The results verify 
hypothesis 2. Moreover, the coefficient in (3) is negatively significant. Although we do 
not include activities (3) as a definition of voice oriented employee association, 
managers in family firms may worry that when such associations resolve complaints, 
they may make demands hindering managers’ policies. In contrast, the coefficient of the 
dummy variable of the family firm in column (4) is not significant. 
 
5. 3.   The effect of employee association on turnover  
Next, we estimate (5.3) to test hypothesis 3: 
Turnover = α+β*Voice Orient Employee association +xγ＋u  (5.3) 
We assume that the coefficient of β is negative, because those who have complaints 
about the firm raise their voice out-with employee associations. Their voices lead to 
lower turnover rates by resolving their complaints. We confirmed that the voice-oriented 
employees’ associations also have a voice effect, as Freeman and Medoff (1984) have 
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discussed. Moreover, we divided the sample into family firms and non-family firms and 
focused on the difference of the coefficient β between these firms. We tested the 
hypothesis that the effect of voice-oriented employee associations will be weaker in 
family firms, because managers in family firms do not listen to their voice.  
Table 6 shows the estimates of (5.3). Column (1) is the result of the full sample. The 
coefficient β is negatively significant. This shows voice-oriented employee associations 
lead to lower turnover rates. Next, we divided the whole sample into family firms and 
non-family ones, to test the different effect of employees on turnover between these 
firms. Columns (2) and (3) detail the results. Although the coefficient β in column (2) is 
not significant, in column (3) it is negatively significant at the 10% level. For a 
robustness check, we estimated the voice-oriented employee association dummy and 
year of voice-oriented employee association separately. These results are shown in 
columns (4) - (9) of Table 6. They show that in general, voice-oriented employee 
associations are effective in lowering the turnover rate, but this only applies to 
non-family firms. Perhaps the effect is not found in family firms because managers from 
family firms “listen to the voice” of employee representations less than non-family 
firms, as many of those who manage in non-family firms are internally promoted, and 
were colleagues of the employees previously. From here, we can test hypothesis 3. 
However, our estimations may be insufficient, because we did not consider the size of 
the firms. In general, there is an inverse relation between company size and proportion 
of family firms. The smaller the size of the company, the greater the ratio of family 
firms, as table 1 shows. Perhaps we may mistakenly identify the effect of the company’s 
size as a family firm effect, though we control the company size by controlling the 
number of employees. To deal with this problem, we divided the sample by the number 
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of employees. Columns (1) and (2) of table 7 show the results of firms which have 100 
or more employees, and columns (3) and (4) for firms which have 1-99 employees. 
Although we can verify our hypothesis in the firms which have 100 or more employees, 
the coefficient β is not significant in the firms which have 1-99 employees. The 
estimations support hypothesis 3 for relatively larger SMEs.  
 
5. 4.   Oaxaca Decomposition  
Finally, we use Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method to explain the difference in 
the means of a turnover rate between family firms and non-family ones by decomposing 
the gap into differences in the mean values of the independent variable within the 
groups, and group differences in the effects of the independent variable. Table 8 shows 
the results of Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. The average of turnover rate in family 
firm is 5.05% and that in non-family firm is 6.86%. The difference is 1.81% and 
statistically significant. We decompose this difference into the explained effects and the 
unexplained effects. The explained effect is 33.6% and the unexplained effect is 66.4%. 
These are also statistically significant.  
  In regard to other variables, the largest part of the explained effects is the 
difference by firm size, which accounts for 38.3% of the difference of the turnover rate 
above mentioned. As for voice-oriented employee associations, which we pay much 
attention to, the dummy variable for this accounts for 4.68% of the overall differences 
of the turnover rate. It reveals that the difference of the turnover rate is partly 
attributable to the difference in the density of employee associations between family 
firms and non-family firms. However, the unexplained effect of voice-oriented 
employee associations is not significant.  
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  The explained effect of the attitude toward lifetime employment accounts for the 
difference of turnover between family and non-family firms. As for the attitude of 
managers toward seniority wage, neither the explained effect nor unexplained one is 
significant. However, the explained effect of regular wage increase is significant at 10% 
level, and it accounts for 37% of the overall differences, although the unexplained effect 
is not significant. 
 
6. Conclusion  
In this paper, we analyzed the relationship between employee associations and 
managers to show that industrial relations in Japanese SMEs are different between 
family and non-family firms. In short, we examined three hypotheses. First, managers 
show a different attitude towards unions between non-family firms and family ones. 
Second, voice-oriented employee associations are formed in non-family firms 
differently from family ones. Third, the voice-effect of these associations on turnover is 
different between family firms and non-family ones.  
Our results were as follows. First, managers in non-family firms have a more 
favorable response towards unions as organizations than those in family firms. 
Managers in family firms tend to regard unions as harmful organizations to their 
management because unions may bring in outsiders that would hinder management. On 
the other hand, those from non-family firms regard unions as good organizations to 
communicate with their employees. Second, voice-oriented employee associations tend 
to be formed more in non-family firms than in family ones. Third, these associations 
have a voice effect suppressing turnover rates in non-family firms, though not in family 
ones. 
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However, this paper has two limitations. First, we do not deal with the endogeneity of 
determining family firm and non-family firm. Second, it may be insufficient to deal 
with the problem of endogeneity that turnover rate might affect the formalizing 
voice-oriented employee associations, though we consider this problem by using years 
of employee associations as an independent variable.  
We conclude that the relationship between managers and voice-oriented employee 
associations differ between family firms and non-family ones in Japanese SMEs. 
Perhaps this is because managers in family firms do not view voice-oriented employee 
associations as useful to the firms. On the contrary, they can be harmful to firms, 
because they impede management. We have shown this by analyzing manager attitudes 
towards unions, though not voice-oriented employee organizations. Moreover, their 
attitude towards these organizations makes it difficult to form voice-oriented employee 
associations in family firms. So, there are less initiatives in family firms that allow 
employees to discuss labor conditions with their managers. In addition, we have shown 
that even if employee associations are formed in family firms, their voice is not strong 
enough to decrease turnover rates by expressing employee complaints. 
In conclusion, employee associations’ voice is effective in non-family firms of 
Japanese SMEs. However, we cannot conclude that voice-oriented employee 
associations can substitute for unions in family firms, because these associations are 
rarely formed in these type of Japanese SMEs. Moreover, employee associations are not 
effective in reducing the turnover rates in family firms. 
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Figure 1  The rate of unionization by firm size 
 
Source：Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare “Survey on Employment Trends” 
Note: Defined small-medium size companies as 5-99 regular employees and large company as more than 100 regular employees 
 
 
Table 1  The percentage of family firm by firm size 
 Employee 
Founder’s family and 
Promoted from employee 
Founder’s family and Not 
Promoted from employee 
Not Founder’s family 
and promoted from 
employee 
Not Founder’s family and not 
promoted from employee 
Full sample 58 4.7 17.4 19.9 
0～5 87.4 5.2 3.7 3.7 
6～20 77.2 5.6 8.8 8.4 
21～50 60 5.4 17.6 17.1 
51～100 57.3 4.6 17.9 20.2 
101～300 51.3 4.2 19.7 24.8 
301～ 44 4.8 24.6 26.6 
Source：Small and Medium Enterprise Agency (2002) “Survey on management strategy” 
0
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Table 2  Definitions of variables 
Variables Definition  
Turnover Rate average percent of voluntary quit yearly for 5 years  
Wage 
 
Activity 1 
Activity 2 
Activity 3 
Activity 4 
Activity 5 
V-Association 
Firm age 
Manager’s tenure 
Lifetime employment 
 
Seniority wage 
 
Manager’s attitude 
 
 
 
State of management 
 
State of competition 
 
 
Regular wage increase 
 
Bonus system 
1= if manager answer “wage is high” to the question “what is problem with your 
firm” 
1=if firms have the activity to talk with manager about labor conditions 
1=if firms have the activity of mutual fund 
1=if firms have the activity to handle employees’ complaints 
1=if firms have the activity to talk with manager about production plan 
1=if firms have the activity of recreations 
1=if firms have activity 1 or activity 4 
Year of firm age 
Years of manager’s tenure 
Use choice “1. Will keep lifetime employment (LE), 2. Will do minor revision 3. 
Will do major revision, 4. LE is not done now 
Use choice “1. Will keep seniority wage (SW), 2. Will do minor revision 3. Will 
do major revision, 4. SW is not done now 
Use choice “1. A is near, 2. A is relatively near, 3. B is relatively near, 4. B is 
near” to the question “Which opinions are nearer to your manager? A: manager 
should listen to the employees’ needs and demands, B: manager do not have 
to listen to them 
Use choice “1. Very good, 2. good, 3.bad, 4. very bad” to the question “what is 
the state of your firm” 
Use choice”1. Very hard, 2. hard, 3. relatively not hard, 4.not hard” to the 
question “what is the state of competition with other firms. 
 
1= if the firm has regular wage as a system of increase as human resource 
management 
1= if the firm has bonus as a system of human resource management 
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Table 3  Summary statistics 
  family firm   non-family firm   
  N mean s.e   N mean s.e   
turnover rate 1367 6.933 8.549   620 5.067 6.258 ** 
activity 1 1367 0.089 0.284 
 
620 0.174 0.380 ** 
activity 2 1367 0.310 0.463 
 
620 0.332 0.471 
 
activity 3 1367 0.068 0.252 
 
620 0.113 0.317 ** 
activity 4 1367 0.048 0.214 
 
620 0.060 0.237 
 
activity 5 1367 0.427 0.495 
 
620 0.432 0.496 
 
V-association 1367 0.109 0.312 
 
620 0.190 0.393 ** 
Year of V-association 1344 2.757 8.826 
 
610 4.549 10.847 ** 
worker 1367 0.132 0.312 
 
620 0.240 0.846 ** 
sale 1264 298628 929137 
 
595 804911 2606921 ** 
firm age 1367 43.399 33.003 
 
620 35.676 23.236 ** 
manager's tenure 1367 17.103 13.068 
 
620 4.306 5.172 ** 
wage 1367 0.067 0.251 
 
620 0.052 0.221 
 
Lifetime employment 1367 2.092 1.056 
 
620 1.861 0.948 ** 
Seniority wage 1367 2.620 0.889 
 
620 2.573 0.850 
 
manager's attitude 1367 2.062 0.853 
 
620 1.982 0.805 * 
state of management 1367 2.404 0.641 
 
620 2.263 0.602 ** 
state of competition 1367 1.770 0.749 
 
620 1.739 0.781 
 
q16a dummy 1367 0.713 0.453 
 
620 0.476 0.500 ** 
q16b dummy 1367 0.252 0.434 
 
620 0.137 0.344 ** 
q16c dummy 1367 0.495 0.500 
 
620 0.347 0.476 ** 
q16d dummy 1367 0.426 0.495 
 
620 0.284 0.451 ** 
q16e dummy 1367 0.465 0.499 
 
620 0.344 0.475 ** 
q16f dummy 1367 0.810 0.393 
 
620 0.706 0.456 ** 
Regular wage increase 1367 0.456 0.498 
 
620 0.635 0.482 ** 
bonus 1367 0.725 0.447   620 0.848 0.359 ** 
+p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01 
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Table 4  Attitude towards Labor Unions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
family firm dummy 0.231 0.100 0.166 0.130 0.133 0.081 
 
[0.030]** [0.022]** [0.029]** [0.028]** [0.029]** [0.026]** 
ln worker 0.005 0.011 0.004 -0.001 -0.013 -0.009 
 
[0.017] [0.014] [0.018] [0.017] [0.017] [0.014] 
ln sale -0.031 -0.012 -0.008 -0.005 0.006 -0.028 
 
[0.016]* [0.013] [0.016] [0.015] [0.015] [0.013]* 
firm age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]+ 
wage -0.035 0.134 0.075 0.098 0.067 0.051 
 
[0.047] [0.044]** [0.049] [0.047]* [0.048] [0.034] 
manager's tenure 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Lifetime employment -0.009 -0.007 -0.009 -0.007 -0.005 -0.018 
 
[0.012] [0.010] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.010]+ 
Seniority wage 0.021 -0.005 0.012 0.028 0.026 0.022 
 
[0.014] [0.011] [0.014] [0.014]* [0.014]+ [0.012]+ 
manager's attitude 0.068 0.041 0.051 0.048 0.046 0.016 
 
[0.014]** [0.011]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.012] 
state of management -0.044 -0.010 -0.020 -0.020 -0.035 -0.032 
 
[0.020]* [0.017] [0.021] [0.020] [0.021]+ [0.017]+ 
state of competition 0.007 -0.007 -0.002 0.008 0.022 -0.004 
 
[0.016] [0.013] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.013] 
Regular wage increase -0.022 -0.019 -0.013 -0.035 -0.024 0.001 
 
[0.026] [0.022] [0.027] [0.026] [0.027] [0.021] 
bonus 0.021 -0.003 0.037 0.019 0.046 0.039 
 
[0.031] [0.025] [0.031] [0.030] [0.031] [0.027] 
industry dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes 
sample size 1864 1864 1864 1864 1864 1864 
log likelihood -1130.93 -925.36 -1241.62 -1192.4 -1231.05 -928.99 
+p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01 
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Table 5  Family Firm and Employee Association 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
family firm dummy -0.047 0.019 -0.047 -0.010 0.011 
 
[0.019]* [0.028] [0.018]** [0.013] [0.030] 
ln worker 0.006 0.037 0.015 0.006 0.043 
 
[0.009] [0.016]* [0.008]+ [0.007] [0.017]* 
ln sale 0.017 0.015 -0.003 -0.004 0.002 
 
[0.009]+ [0.014] [0.008] [0.007] [0.015] 
firm age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
wage 0.007 0.022 0.030 0.006 0.047 
 
[0.029] [0.046] [0.029] [0.021] [0.048] 
manager's tenure 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]** [0.000] [0.001]** 
Lifetime employment 0.010 -0.015 0.004 0.005 -0.002 
 
[0.007] [0.012] [0.006] [0.005] [0.012] 
Seniority wage -0.012 -0.026 0.002 -0.002 -0.031 
 
[0.008] [0.014]+ [0.007] [0.006] [0.014]* 
manager's attitude -0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.009 -0.020 
 
[0.008] [0.013] [0.007] [0.006] [0.014] 
state of management 0.006 0.041 -0.005 -0.015 -0.012 
 
[0.011] [0.019]* [0.010] [0.008]+ [0.020] 
state of competition -0.022 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.021 
 
[0.010]* [0.015] [0.009] [0.007] [0.016] 
q16b dummy -0.003 -0.025 0.001 -0.010 0.002 
 
[0.019] [0.029] [0.016] [0.012] [0.032] 
q16c dummy -0.042 0.005 -0.013 -0.006 0.000 
 
[0.015]** [0.025] [0.013] [0.011] [0.027] 
q16f dummy -0.059 -0.030 -0.034 -0.027 0.001 
 
[0.019]** [0.029] [0.017]* [0.014]+ [0.030] 
Regular wage increase 0.053 0.045 0.042 0.028 0.055 
 
[0.015]** [0.025]+ [0.014]** [0.011]** [0.027]* 
bonus 0.003 0.048 0.000 -0.004 0.081 
 
[0.019] [0.029]+ [0.016] [0.014] [0.031]** 
industry dummy yes yes yes yes yes 
sample size 1859 1859 1966 1830 1859 
log likelihood -598.36 -1114.4 -503.66 -368.93 -1230.41 
+p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01 
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Table 6  Effect of employee association on turnover  
 
+p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
full fam non-fam full fam non-fam full fam non-fam
voice empl association -1.54 -1.055 -1.358 -1.067 -0.79 -1.075
[0.775]* [1.293] [0.793]+ [0.361]** [0.533] [0.436]*
year of empl association 0.022 0.015 0.013 -0.027 -0.019 -0.03
[0.026] [0.042] [0.027] [0.012]* [0.017] [0.015]*
Ln worker -0.101 -0.299 0.184 -0.074 -0.201 0.144 -0.103 -0.307 0.185
[0.292] [0.428] [0.351] [0.292] [0.431] [0.348] [0.292] [0.429] [0.351]
Ln sale -0.747 -0.515 -0.754 -0.79 -0.636 -0.695 -0.745 -0.504 -0.757
[0.216]** [0.340] [0.249]** [0.220]** [0.349]+ [0.245]** [0.216]** [0.340] [0.249]**
firm age -0.026 -0.031 -0.018 -0.025 -0.031 -0.017 -0.025 -0.031 -0.016
[0.005]** [0.007]** [0.008]* [0.005]** [0.007]** [0.008]* [0.005]** [0.007]** [0.008]*
wage -1.417 -1.648 -1.609 -1.439 -1.656 -1.598 -1.4 -1.626 -1.636
[0.543]** [0.674]* [0.971]+ [0.538]** [0.673]* [0.931]+ [0.543]* [0.673]* [0.969]+
manager's tenure 0.008 -0.015 0.074 0.009 -0.015 0.077 0.008 -0.015 0.073
[0.014] [0.017] [0.061] [0.014] [0.017] [0.061] [0.014] [0.017] [0.061]
Lifetime employment 0.547 0.574 0.437 0.638 0.713 0.387 0.542 0.568 0.435
[0.209]** [0.264]* [0.268] [0.212]** [0.268]** [0.267] [0.209]** [0.264]* [0.267]
Seniority wage 0.372 0.371 0.383 0.319 0.3 0.371 0.382 0.374 0.407
[0.238] [0.306] [0.332] [0.239] [0.306] [0.330] [0.238] [0.306] [0.332]
manager's attitude 0.146 0.315 -0.148 0.167 0.328 -0.133 0.161 0.327 -0.142
[0.217] [0.279] [0.356] [0.217] [0.279] [0.355] [0.217] [0.279] [0.355]
state of management 1.153 1.296 0.888 1.137 1.235 0.88 1.154 1.297 0.883
[0.351]** [0.470]** [0.465]+ [0.346]** [0.462]** [0.461]+ [0.351]** [0.470]** [0.467]+
state of competetion -0.197 0.2 -0.85 -0.159 0.224 -0.796 -0.195 0.196 -0.838
[0.253] [0.354] [0.301]** [0.251] [0.350] [0.297]** [0.253] [0.354] [0.301]**
q16b dummy 0.046 -0.236 0.876 -0.014 -0.331 0.991 0.053 -0.248 0.955
[0.414] [0.482] [0.858] [0.411] [0.476] [0.850] [0.414] [0.482] [0.855]
q16c dummy -0.638 -0.972 -0.13 -0.685 -0.973 -0.272 -0.619 -0.963 -0.116
[0.371]+ [0.482]* [0.537] [0.369]+ [0.481]* [0.531] [0.371]+ [0.481]* [0.538]
q16f dummy -0.1 -0.117 -0.064 -0.127 -0.239 0.114 -0.109 -0.109 -0.103
[0.452] [0.642] [0.585] [0.457] [0.654] [0.575] [0.451] [0.643] [0.582]
Regular wage increase -0.136 0.256 -0.847 -0.042 0.377 -0.79 -0.159 0.252 -0.905
[0.394] [0.513] [0.568] [0.391] [0.510] [0.557] [0.395] [0.513] [0.568]
bonus -0.719 -0.848 -0.107 -0.82 -1.014 -0.06 -0.716 -0.844 -0.11
[0.527] [0.647] [0.803] [0.525] [0.645] [0.797] [0.527] [0.647] [0.803]
industry dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
sample size 1834 1243 586 1864 1264 595 1834 1243 586
R2 0.12 0.11 0.18 0.12 0.12 0.17 0.11 0.11 0.18
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Table 7  Effect of employee association on turnover by firm size 
 
+p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
fam 100> nonfam>100 fam<100 nonfam<100
voice empl association 0.9 -2.477 -1.439 0.468
[2.474] [0.959]* [1.369] [1.186]
year of empl association -0.021 0.049 0.018 -0.042
[0.075] [0.034] [0.047] [0.042]
ln worker 0.113 1.467 -0.697 -1.537
[0.592] [0.640]* [0.704] [0.780]*
Ln sale -0.604 -0.914 -0.303 -0.648
[0.414] [0.401]* [0.459] [0.359]+
firm age -0.031 -0.004 -0.03 -0.026
[0.009]** [0.010] [0.009]** [0.012]*
wage -1.618 -1.534 -1.691 0.539
[0.914]+ [1.177] [0.923]+ [1.466]
manager's tenure -0.039 0.084 -0.008 0.066
[0.022]+ [0.087] [0.022] [0.075]
Lifetime employment 0.36 0.79 0.581 0.105
[0.309] [0.405]+ [0.345]+ [0.362]
Seniority wage 0.167 0.038 0.467 0.676
[0.353] [0.372] [0.404] [0.511]
manager's attitude -0.142 -0.4 0.463 0.086
[0.310] [0.300] [0.368] [0.639]
state of management 0.481 0.508 1.44 1.307
[0.539] [0.529] [0.605]* [0.689]+
state of competition 0.749 -0.704 -0.074 -0.889
[0.554] [0.363]+ [0.450] [0.484]+
q16b dummy 0.429 -2.371 -0.433 3.487
[0.713] [0.980]* [0.630] [1.286]**
q16c dummy -0.706 0.947 -0.822 -0.774
[0.662] [0.738] [0.643] [0.779]
q16f dummy -0.556 0.793 -0.034 -1.112
[0.737] [0.608] [0.868] [0.987]
Regular wage increase 0.128 -1.086 0.411 -0.646
[0.656] [0.871] [0.683] [0.742]
bonus 0.269 0.087 -1.204 -0.491
[0.737] [0.999] [0.828] [1.040]
industry dummy yes yes yes yes
sample size 349 276 894 310
R2 0.27 0.27 0.1 0.26
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Table 8 Oaxaca Blinder Decomposition  
+p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01 
  Explained Unexplained 
  coef s.d % coef s.d % 
Employee association -0.085** 0.031 4.7 -0.041 0.113 2.3 
Ln worker -0.089 0.225 4.9 1.532 2.907 -84.5 
Ln sale -0.695** 0.187 38.3 -0.687 6.211 37.9 
Firm age 0.205** 0.073 -11.3 0.506* 0.206 -27.9 
Wage 0.024 0.018 -1.3 0.004 0.072 -0.2 
Manager's tenure 0.095 0.182 -5.2 0.488 0.308 -26.9 
Lifetime employment -0.134* 0.061 7.4 -0.622 0.484 34.3 
Seniority wage -0.010 0.013 0.6 0.183 1.070 -10.1 
Manager's attitude -0.012 0.025 0.6 -0.922 0.977 50.8 
State of management -0.158+ 0.081 8.7 -0.812 1.561 44.8 
State of competition 0.008 0.012 -0.4 -1.784** 0.538 98.4 
q16b dummy 0.007 0.049 -0.4 0.210* 0.089 -11.6 
q16c dummy 0.120** 0.033 -6.6 0.273 0.172 -15.1 
q16f dummy 0.017 0.050 -1.0 0.259 0.589 -14.3 
Regular wage increase 0.004 0.070 -0.2 -0.678+ 0.348 37.4 
Bonus -0.100 0.071 5.5 0.788 0.659 -43.4 
Construction -0.003 0.011 0.2 -0.076 0.085 4.2 
Electricity 0.010 0.012 -0.6 -0.002 0.006 0.1 
Information 0.037 0.039 -2.0 0.035 0.041 -1.9 
Delivery 0.023 0.024 -1.3 -0.045 0.061 2.5 
Commerce -0.033 0.043 1.8 -0.198 0.204 10.9 
Finance 0.104 0.114 -5.7 -0.085 0.094 4.7 
Real estate 0.003 0.004 -0.2 0.013 0.018 -0.7 
Food service -0.013 0.016 0.7 0.136 0.151 -7.5 
Medical 0.028 0.033 -1.5 0.034 0.049 -1.9 
Education -0.020 0.023 1.1 -0.011 0.012 0.6 
Serve 0.063 0.054 -3.5 -0.206 0.207 11.3 
Others -0.003 0.004 0.2 -0.063 0.069 3.5 
Constant   0.0 0.567 4.651 -31.2 
Total -0.609** 0.223 33.6 -1.205** 0.356 66.4 
Prediction_1  5.049  0.453   
Prediction_2  6.863  0.555   
Difference  -1.814  0.326   
